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a b s t r a c t
The incentives of Dutch dairy farmers to participate in a voluntary Johne’s Disease (JD) control pro-
gramme were investigated using a case–control design. Furthermore, farm and farmers’ characteristics
of case and control farmers were compared. Dairy farmers in the northern part of the Netherlands were
interviewed based on a standardized questionnaire. Exact logistic regression analysis showed that partic-
ipating farmers (case farmers) were more motivated by internal factors (that relate to farm performance
and the individual farmer) than non-participating farmers (control farmers). For example, animal health
andwelfare awarenesshadan increasedoddsof 33.3, andeconomic lossesdue to JDof 4.5. External factors
relating to the performance of the dairy sector as well as to consumer health, had little inﬂuence on the
decision to participate. Case farmers were less interested in test costs than control farmers. Furthermore,
the case farmers liked to have a well-organized farm now and in the future and tried to avoid (potential)
economic losses due to JD as much as possible. They were more focused on future gains than on current
costs. In contrast, the control farmers were motivated merely by the direct and future costs that related
to the JD programme, including costs for changing management. The effect of currently being a control
farmer, compared with case farmers, showed increased odds of almost 4 and 64-fold, respectively, on
‘change in test costs’ and ‘change in regulatory requirements’ as incentives to participate in the future.
© 2011 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.. Introduction
Paratuberculosis, or Johne’s Disease (JD), is chronic infectious
nteritis of ruminants caused by Mycobacterium avium subsp.
aratuberculosis (MAP). It is characterized by an incubation period
f up to15years [1]. Clinically affected cattle have anon-responsive
iarrhoea that leads to severe loss of body condition [2]. In the
rst 30 days of life, calves are most susceptible and initiation of
n infection requires as few as six organisms [1]. The probability
f successful infection reduces with age, but is considered to con-
inue until cattle are 12months old [1,3]. Infection can occur via the
aecal–oral route, e.g., intake of contaminated colostrum or milk or
xposure to a contaminated environment [4]. Only 5% of infected
nimals will develop clinical symptoms [5]. Clinically affected ani-
als often excrete large numbers of MAP-bacteria in their faeces
4]. An effective treatment is not available and clinically affected
attle are usually slaughtered [6]. Therefore, disease detection and
arm-management practices are the best alternatives to reduce the
ncidence of JD [7].
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +31 317 484065.
E-mail address: geralda.hop@wur.nl (G.E. Hop).
573-5214/$ – see front matter © 2011 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
oi:10.1016/j.njas.2011.03.001Economic costs of JD [8] and public health concernswith respect
to a possible relationship between JD and Crohn’s disease [9,10]
have led to the implementation of control programmes in a num-
ber of countries, speciﬁcally in Australia, the Netherlands, Canada
(Alberta) and the United States [11]. In the Netherlands, several JD
control programmeshave been initiated, starting at provincial level
in1922andatnational level in1952 [12].Variousprogrammeshave
evolved since, but none of them resulted in the desired reduction
of the number of infected herds. The two main reasons behind the
failures were considered to be (1) the lack of sensitive diagnostic
tests and (2) the fact that farmers did not improve calfmanagement
sufﬁciently [12,13]. In 1998, a new – more intensive – programme
was developed that aimed to eradicate the bacterium from theherd
[12]. Not many farmers joined the programme, possibly because
of its complexity and costs involved, whereas direct beneﬁts for a
farmer to have a certiﬁed MAP-free herd were small [14]. There-
fore, a simpliﬁed control programme was developed that aimed to
reduce the number of MAP-bacteria per litre of bulk milk rather
than eradicate MAP from the herd. This Dutch Paratuberculosis
Programme (PPN) considered a concentration ofMAP-organisms in
milkof less than103/l acceptable [15].However, a studybyVelthuis
et al. [16], based on a decision-tree analysis in which risks and eco-
nomic consequences of the programme were weighted, showed
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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the spread of JD or to become free from JD, (18) ease or difﬁ-
culty to achieve the requirements of the programme, and (19) other
incentives.8 G.E. Hop et al. / NJAS - Wageningen
hat the preferred decisionwas not to join any programmewithout
milk price differentiation or another incentive. However, despite
he apparent lack of proﬁtability of joining such a control pro-
ramme, about 6% of all Dutch dairy farmers decided to join the
impliﬁed programme.
Sociological and social–psychological theories [17–19] suggest
hat decisions of farmers on implementing recommendedpractices
re not just inﬂuenced by their knowledge, but also by percep-
ions regarding their own aspirations, capacities, opportunities,
esponsibilities, identities, and duties. For example, when deciding
bout whether or not to participate in a JD programme, a farmer
ay consider (consciously or not): (1) the availability of sufﬁcient
nowledge and skills to reach the highest level in a programme
belief in own capacities), (2) the negative attitude of other farm-
rs (social pressure), and (3) how it will affect (the balance and
rade-offs between) important aspirations such as income, spare
ime, peace of mind and good relations with other farmers. On the
ther hand, people are often more sensitive to how their current
ituation differs from some reference level than to the absolute
haracteristics of the situation. Therefore, people are more averse
o losses than they are attracted to same-sized gains [20] and, in
he domain of money, people value modest losses roughly twice as
uch as equal-sized gains [21]. Due to this loss aversion, two log-
cally equivalent choice options in terms of the outcomes (but not
ransparently equivalent in terms of description) lead individuals
o make different choices [22]. Only a few studies incorporated the
ehavioural side of the choice of the farmerwith respect to improv-
ng paratuberculosis management practices (e.g. [23,24]), whereas
ther studies deal with only monetary factors (e.g. [11,25]).
Incentives to participate in a voluntary JD programme men-
ioned by Kovich et al. [24] were herd health, marketability of
urplus cattle, free testing and consumer health. Their studymainly
ocused on the perceived value (in terms of economic advantages)
hat enrolled producers gained from participation in a JD pro-
ramme. In a study related to mastitis [26], incentives of farmers to
mprove mastitis management were linked to farmer characteris-
ics in order to gain knowledge on how adoption ofmastitis control
ractices can be encouraged. Farmerswere especiallymotivated by
aving an efﬁcient (well-organized) farm that easily complies with
egulatory requirements. This suggested that the improvement of
astitis management was mainly driven by factors that are inter-
al to the farm and the individual farmer, since they accounted for
bout 85% of importance of the considered factors. Farmers consid-
red extra ﬁnancial incentives, together with economic losses, for
round 30% of the importance, which indicates that farmers are not
otivated merely by money in their decisions.
The objectives of our study were (1) to assess the incentives
hat played a role for farmers in deciding to participate or not
n the intensive or simpliﬁed Dutch JD programme or to partici-
ate or not in the future and (2) to compare the farm and farmers’
haracteristics between cases and controls.
. Materials and methods
.1. Study design and farm selection
To investigate the incentives of dairy farmers for the decision to
articipate or not in a Dutch JD programme, a case–control study
as carried out. Cases were deﬁned as farmers who participated in
JD programme, regardless the type of programme (the intensive
r the simpliﬁed one). Controls were farmers who did not partic-
pate in a JD programme. All farms were located in two northern
rovinces of the Netherlands (Friesland and Groningen) to reduce
he geographical variation and because the prevalence of JD in
hese provinces was higher compared with the other provincesal of Life Sciences 58 (2011) 57–64
[27]. A case farm was matched to a control farm by province. Given
that 75% of the northern farms are located in Friesland and 25%
in Groningen [28], the selection process was carried out in such a
way that the same geographic representation occurred in the sam-
ple. Convenience sampling was used to select farmers (sources:
veterinarians, Animal Science students of Wageningen University,
the Dutch Network of Paratuberculosis,1 and the telephone guide).
A letter containing a short description of the study was sent to
43 farmers to invite them to participate in a personal interview
of approximately 1h. After one week, the farmers were phoned
to ask whether they would like to participate and, if positive, to
make an appointment. The farmers were guaranteed that their
responses would be treated as anonymous and conﬁdential. Of the
approached farmers, 20 cases and 20 controls agreed to participate
(response rate 93%). The farmerswere visited between6March and
9 April 2008.
2.2. Interview design and testing
The interviews were conducted using a standardized ques-
tionnaire with open and closed questions. The questionnaire was
based on scientiﬁc literature and feedback from two scientists
of Wageningen University and Research Centre, one being an
economist and veterinarian (Dr. R.H.M. Bergevoet, Doctor of Vet-
erinary Medicine (DVM), PhD, Business Economics Group) and the
other an animal scientist working on a project about commu-
nication strategies and social factors related to mastitis control
practices (Mrs. J. Jansen, PhD Communication and Innovation Stud-
ies Group). The full text of the questionnaire is available from
the authors upon request. The interview was pre-tested on one
case farmer and on one control farmer. First the interview was
performed in the same way every farmer in this study was inter-
viewed. Thereafter, the farmers reviewed the questions, especially
the incentives, for completeness to ensure that all important factors
were addressed. The case farmer of the pre-testwas included in the
study, because only small textual changes needed to bemade to the
questionnaire and the interviewwas performed in the sameway all
other farmers were interviewed. The control farmer of the pre-test
was excluded, since the farm was not located in the study area.
The questionnaire consisted of two parts and was identical for
case and control farmers. The ﬁrst part covered background demo-
graphic information on e.g., farmer age, farming goals and farm
size. The second part of the questionnaire focused on JD man-
agement and the incentives of farmers to (not) participate in a
JD programme. Answers to closed questions consisted of Likert-
scale scores (e.g., 1 = really unlikely, 5 = really likely), short factual
answers and yes/no responses.
The 19 predeﬁned incentives for current participation or not
were: (1) job satisfaction, (2) overall situation on the farm, (3)
economic losses due to JD, (4) animal health and welfare aware-
ness, (5) ease in meeting future regulatory requirements, (6) dairy
product quality and image, (7) extra ﬁnancial incentives based on
programme status, (8) recognition for a job well done, (9) pub-
lic health concerns regarding a possible relationship between JD
and Crohn’s disease, (10) advice from advisors like veterinarians,
(11) test costs, (12) reliability of tests, (13) inﬂuence on farm man-
agement, (14) inﬂuence on spare time, (15) inﬂuence on working
pleasure, (16) costs for changingmanagement, buildings etc. (apart
from test costs), (17) inadequacy of the programme to prevent1 The Dutch Network of Paratuberculosis, a group of farmers with status 10 in
the intensive JD programme, aims to eradicate paratuberculosis and wants to create
more awareness for the possible consequences of the disease.
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To avoid inﬂuencing the farmers’ answers, farmers ﬁrst had
o answer an open-ended question about incentives to partic-
pate or not in the programme, after which the question was
sked as a closed question, using Likert-scales for every incentive
1= important, 5 = very important).
The same procedure was followed for the question about which
spectsmight play a role in future participation (or not anymore) in
JD programme. Here, the six incentives were: (1) extra ﬁnancial
ncentives, (2) advice from advisors e.g., veterinarians, (3) change
n test costs, (4) change in public health concerns, (5) change in
egulatory requirements and (6) availability of a vaccine for JD.
.3. Data analyses
Statistical analysis was done using SAS (SAS, version 9.1). The
epresentativeness of the study farmswas investigated by compar-
ng sample means of general farm characteristics of the Dutch and
orthern (Friesland and Groningen) dairy farm population means.
he differences between these means were analysed using a 1-
ample t-test. Differences were considered statistically signiﬁcant
f p≤0.05.
Exact logistic regression analysis was performed to identify fac-
ors related to the decision to participate or not in a JD programme
dependent variable). It was also used to identify the inﬂuence of
hat decision on the incentives to participate or not in the future.
he analyses were carried out according to Hosmer and Lemeshow
29]. This included a univariable and a multivariable step. In the
nivariable analysis the association between the predictor vari-
bles and the dependent variable was investigated. Continuous
ariables were checked for linearity of the regression. If not linear,
ontinuous variables were split into categories or they were split
t the median. The Likelihood Ratio Test was used for statistical
igniﬁcance testing of both categorical and continuous variables.
For the future decision to participate or not another univariable
odelwas used,where the dependent variableswere the six future
ncentives to participate or not and the independent variable was
he current state (case or control).
Pearson’s correlation coefﬁcients among the predictor variables
ere examined. If two variableswere highly correlated (|rho|>0.6),
he one with the largest number of high correlations with other
ariables was included in further analysis; the other one was
xcluded. Variables that showed a p-value≤0.25 in the univariable
nalysis qualiﬁed for the multivariable analysis, which consisted of
xact logistic regression analysis using amodel inwhich initially all
ualiﬁed variables of the univariable analysis were included. How-
ver, the model could not be solved because too many variables
ualiﬁed for the multivariable analysis. Therefore, three clusters of
ariables were created to progress, where the variables within a
luster were tested and selected in different multivariable models.
he three clusterswere ‘advice and knowledge’ (own experience or
dvice from advisors e.g., veterinarians), ‘farm management’, and
incentives to participate or not in a JD programme’.
To examine possible confounding, variables with the highest p-
alue were deleted from the cluster model and the change in the
’s of the other variables was inspected. A variable was consid-
red to be a confounder if the relative change of one of the ˇ’s
as at least 25% (when |ˇ| was ≥0.40) or at least 0.1 absolute
when |ˇ|<0.40). In the next step, a variable was considered to be
tatistically signiﬁcant if the change in deviance was more than
he critical Chi-square value obtained from the likelihood ratio.
ubsequently, a conditional backward elimination procedure was
sed. Non-signiﬁcant variables (p>0.05) were removed from the
odel one by one until only signiﬁcant variables or confounders
emained. Finally, interaction terms were added to the model and
ested for statistical signiﬁcance. All variables that were selected
ithin each cluster were tested in one ﬁnal multivariable modelal of Life Sciences 58 (2011) 57–64 59
and again, the same backward elimination procedure was carried
out.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive results
Descriptive characteristics of the herds of case and control farm-
ers, of the average Dutch farms and the average farms in the region
of origin of the study farms are listed in Table 1. The farm charac-
teristics did not differ signiﬁcantly between case and control farms.
The average study farmwas signiﬁcantly larger andhadhigher pro-
duction levels compared with both the average Dutch farm and the
average farm in the provinces Groningen and Friesland.
Most farmer characteristics did not differ signiﬁcantly between
case and control farms (Table 1). Case farmers had signiﬁcantly
more farming experience than control farmers, 29.4 years and 22.3
years, respectively. Furthermore, a signiﬁcantly larger proportion
of the case farmers had participated in study groups (80% of the
cases compared with 45% of the controls) and in the ‘Salmonella
Unsuspected’ control programme (80% of the case farmers com-
pared with 50% of the control farmers).
3.2. Analysis of incentives
Case and control farmers differed in their indication of the top
three most important incentives for their decision to participate
or not in the JD programme (Fig. 1). Case farmers focused on ani-
mal health and welfare, job satisfaction, economic losses due to JD
and public health concerns, whereas the control farmers focused
on test costs, test reliability and the costs of changing farm man-
agement. For both groups the ‘overall situation on the farm’ was
very important for the decision to participate or not.
In the open-ended question to name incentives to participate or
not, six case farmers indicated that the cows had health problems
possibly due to JD in the past and they wanted to control the sit-
uation, whereas three other case farmers indicated that they were
curious about the JD situation. In contrast, seven control farmers
indicated that they did not participate because they had no prob-
lems with JD on their farm.
3.2.1. Univariable analyses
The incentives that scored signiﬁcantly different between cases
and controls are listed in Table 2. The incentives ‘animal health and
welfare awareness’ and ‘(potential) economic losses due to JD’were
associated with increased odds of participation in a JD programme
(OR of 33.3 and 4.5 (per unit), respectively). On the other hand,
‘reliability of tests’, ‘costs of changing management, buildings etc.
(apart from the test costs)’ and ‘test costs’ were associated with
increased odds of not participating of at least 20-fold.
The effect of currently being a control farmer, compared with
case farmers, showed increased odds of almost 4 and 64-fold,
respectively, on ‘change in test costs’ and ‘change in regulatory
requirements’ as incentives to participate in the future (Table 3).
In both groups of farmers, the incentive ‘the presence or absence
of JD on the farm’ (whether or not it has been tested in the past
or that it is the farmers’ belief based on clinical signs in the past)
was an important criterion for deciding to participate or not in a
JD programme, since it was mentioned by 75% of the farmers (80%
of the case farmers and 70% of the control farmers) as one of the
threemain incentives to participate. This is in linewith the fact that
case farmers tended to have (had) more problems with JD on the
farm (p<0.10) andwith over 2-fold increased odds for participating
farms in the believe of having (had) JD on their farm.
Theveterinarianwas seen as an important source of information
to increase theknowledgeof JDbyboth thecaseandcontrol farmers
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Table 1
Descriptive characteristics of cases and controls in the study herds, compared with the average Dutch dairy farm and the average dairy farm in the northern provinces of the
Netherlands.
Variable Study herds Average dairy farm in
Cases (n=20) Controls (n=20) The Netherlandsa (n=262) Northern provincesb (n=3599)
Farmer age (yrs) 46.6 43.8 NAc NA
Farming experience (yrs) 29.4 22.3 NA NA
<25 years (%) 15 55* NA NA
≥25 years (%) 85 45 NA NA
Number of dairy cows (#) 104.4 104.4 69.1** 81.7**
Number of young stock (#) 81.0 70.9 60.3** NA
Milk production per cow (kg) 8783 8373 7910** 8007**
Milk quota (kg) 848,550 788,245 556,400** NA
Full time labour units (#) 1.63 1.63 1.61 NA
Farm size (ha) 66.2 61.4 45.0** NA
Pasture (ha) 58.8 53.8 35.5** NA
Maize ﬁeld (ha) 7.0 7.1 7.3 NA
Other ﬁelds (ha) 0.4 0.5 2.2** NA
Successor available
Yes (%) 0 25 NA NA
No (%) 45 30 NA NA
Unknown (%) 55 45 NA NA
Participating in
Study group (%) 80 45* NA NA
Salmonella Unsuspected (%) 80 50* NA NA
Purchase cattle
No (%) 25 40 NA NA
Yes (%) 75 60 NA NA
Production animals (#/yr) 0.9 1.8 NA NA
Breeding animals (#/yr) 0.1 0.1 NA NA
a Sample of 262 out of 19,250 dairy farms in the Netherlands. Source: [28].
b Source: [37].
(
c
t
t
F
tc NA=not available.
* Controls statistically different from cases at p<0.05 (Likelihood Ratio Test).
** Controls statistically different from cases at p<0.01 (1-sample t-test).reasonably to highly important for 95% of the cases and 80% of the
ontrols). However, for 85% of the control farmers the ‘advice from
he veterinarian’ did not play an important role in the decision not
o participate whereas it did play an important role for 70% of the
ig. 1. Importance of incentives as scored by the number of case and control farmers that
o participate or not in the Dutch paratuberculosis programme.case farmers. Moreover, talking with the veterinarian about JD was
associated with increased odds of participating of almost 3-fold
(p<0.05), indicating that case farmers were more willing to take
notice of the advice from the veterinarian.
ranked the incentive as the ﬁrst, second or third most important one in the decision
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Table 2
Distributions, univariable odds ratios and 95% conﬁdence intervals of signiﬁcant farmers’ current incentives (cases compared with controls) to participate or not in a JD
programme.
Incentive Classa Class frequency (%) ORb 95% CIc Overall p-value
Case Control
Animal health and welfare awareness <0.10
1 10 40 1.0 ref.d
2 0 35 0.55 0; 7.63
3 5 10 1.89 0.02; 59.62
4 30 10 10.04 0.92; 188.36
5 55 5 33.25 2.58; >1000
Reliability of tests <0.05
1 30 5 20.67 1.54; >1000
2 30 10 11.25 1.06; 208.48
3 15 25 2.56 0.21; 40.79
4 15 15 4.07 0.31; 73.21
5 10 45 1.0 ref.
Costs for changing management <0.05
1 55 10 41.35 3.35; >1000
2 15 15 8.46 0.48; 575.73
3 10 10 8.08 0.30; 646.82
4 15 15 8.46 0.48; 575.73
5 5 50 1.0 ref.
Test costs <0.05
1 35 10 26.60 1.98; >1000
2 30 10 22.91 1.64; >1000
3 5 10 4.28 0.04; 430.66
4 25 20 10.81 0.84; 648.48
5 5 50 1.0 ref.
Potential economic losses due to JD Ce – – 4.49 1.70; 17.98 <0.05
a Range=1–5 (1=no inﬂuence; 2 = almost no inﬂuence; 3 = some inﬂuence; 4 = reasonable inﬂuence; 5 =much inﬂuence).
b OR=odds ratio.
400–
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pc 95% CI =95% conﬁdence interval.
d ref. = reference category.
e Continuous = range 1–6 (1=10–100; 2=100–200; 3=200–300; 4=300–400; 5=
.2.2. Multivariable analyses
Table 4 presents the distributions and odds ratios of the ﬁnal
ultivariable models of the clusters ‘advice/knowledge’ and ‘farm
anagement’. In both models no statistically signiﬁcant interac-
ionswere found. TheHosmer andLemeshowGoodness-of-Fit tests
erenot statistically signiﬁcant (p=0.94 andp=0.78, respectively),
hich indicates that themodels showed sufﬁcient ﬁt. No ﬁnalmul-
ivariable model parameters are given for the cluster ‘incentives’,
ince the odds ratioswere zero or (almost) inﬁnite due to cells with
zero or almost zero count. This is due to the fact that case and con-
rol farmers held strongly different opinions about the importance
f the incentives. For example, case farmers deemed animal health
nd welfare very important and cost of changing management not
mportant, whereas control farmers were of the opposite opinion.
urthermore, the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test was
tatistically signiﬁcant, which indicates insufﬁcient ﬁt.
In the cluster ‘advice/knowledge’, three variables were asso-
iated with increased odds of participating. The variable ‘talking
able 3
istributions, univariable odds ratios and 95% conﬁdence intervals of statistically signi
articipate in a JD programme in the future.
Incentives Current state
Inﬂuence of current state on ‘change in test costs’ as an
incentive to participate in the future.e
Case
Control
Inﬂuence of current state on ‘change in regulatory
requirements’ as an incentive to participate in the future.
Case
Control
a Low=no–some inﬂuence.
b High= reasonable–much inﬂuence.
c OR=odds ratio.
d 95% CI =95% conﬁdence interval.
e Participating in the future compared with not participating in the future.
f ref., reference category.500; 6≥500 Euros per year); median of range=5.82.
with someone of the Animal Health Service about JD’ had an
increased odds of 3.36, ‘capability of managing JD problems to
control the disease’ of 13.64 and ‘level of knowledge about pos-
sible consequences of JD on the farm’ of 7.88. The fourth variable,
‘reading professional literature to increase knowledge of JD’, was
associated with increased odds of not participating of (1/OR=)
12.5.
In the cluster ‘farm management’, all three variables were
associated signiﬁcantlywith increased odds of participating. ‘Expe-
rience with dairy cattle for more than 25 years’ had an increased
odds of 8.65, ‘picking up animals via regular driveway’ of 4.42 and
‘farming goal: obtain a high proﬁt’ of 2.97. On the other hand, in the
univariable analysis the parameter ‘picking up animals occurs via
the regular driveway’ was the only parameter of the 24 farm man-
agement practices mentioned in the questionnaire that differed
signiﬁcantly between case and control farms, which indicates that
there were only minor differences between the farm management
of case and control farms. On a scale of 1 to 5 (desired score =1),
ﬁcant inﬂuences of currently being a case or control farmer on the incentives to
Inﬂuence frequency (%) ORc 95% CId Overall p-value
Lowa Highb
80 20 ref.f ref. <0.10
45 55 3.86 0.83; 21.73
95 5 ref. ref. <0.05
20 80 63.80 6.82; >1000
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Table 4
Distributions, multivariable odds ratios and 95% conﬁdence intervals of ﬁnal model parameters (cases compared with controls).
Variable Class Class frequency (%) ORa 95% CIb
Cases Controls
Cluster 1: advice/knowledgec
Reading professional literature to increase knowledge of JD Ce – – 0.08** 0.00; 0.44
Talking with someone of the Animal Health Service about JD Cf – – 3.36* 0.98; 24.31
Capability of managing JD problems to control the disease Cg – – 13.64** 1.14; 960.89
Level of knowledge about possible consequences of JD on the farm Ch – – 7.88* 0.96; 639.67
Cluster 2: farm managementd
Experience with dairy cattle (yrs) <25 15 55 ref.i ref.
≥25 85 45 8.65** 1.27; 109.36
Picking up animals via regular driveway Cf – – 4.42** 1.25; 58.89
Farming goal: obtain a high proﬁt Ce – – 2.97** 1.03; 10.20
Cluster 3: incentives
No ﬁnal model parametersj
* p<0.10.
** p<0.05.
a OR=odds ratio.
b 95% CI =95% conﬁdence interval.
c Deviance difference of model =35.2 with 4 d.f. (p<0.0001).
d Deviance difference of model =22.2 with 3 d.f. (p<0.0001).
e Continuous =not important–important.
f Continuous =never–very frequently.
g Continuous = entirely incapable–entirely capable.
h Continuous = insufﬁcient–sufﬁcient knowledge.
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si ref., reference category.
j No ﬁnal model parameters are given, odds ratios were zero or (almost) inﬁnity.
he average score for the 24 farm management practices was 2.01,
hich indicates that several practices can be improved.
.3. Results open-ended questions interview
Farmers were also asked to answer open-ended questions
egarding JD. Case farmers believed that their ‘capability tomanage
D problems’ and their ‘level of knowledge regarding JD’ (Table 4)
as high because of their experiencewith JD, animal health aware-
ess and talking with their veterinarian, whereas the control
armersmentioned that the factors time, (almost)noproblemswith
D, less awareness and not enough interest in the disease inﬂu-
nced their capability and level of knowledge in a negative way.
he questions to test farmers’ capability and knowledge showed
o differences between case and control farmers’ estimates about
annual losses on an average contaminated Dutch dairy farm’. Con-
rol farmers tended to show a better insight into the ‘annual costs
f participating in a JD programme for both an average contami-
ated and not contaminated Dutch dairy farm’ (p>0.05, not every
armer answered this question, which reduced the power of the
nalysis). The costs estimated by control farmers were D796 and
1283 for not contaminated and contaminated farms, respectively,
hereas the case farmers’ estimates amounted to D550 and D1033,
espectively, which is D200 less.
. Discussion
This case–control study was carried out to evaluate the incen-
ives of farmers to participate or not in a JD programme, and to link
hese incentives to farm and farmer characteristics.
The response rate was high (93%), especially if compared with
hose reported for recent interviews with other dairy producers,
hich varied between 61% and 77%, e.g. [30,31]. This might be
n effect of the convenience sampling, where most farmers were
amed by somebody in their social network. Cases and controls
id not differ signiﬁcantly with respect to farm characteristics.
owever, the study farms were larger and more specialized than
he average Dutch and northern farms, which was found in other
tudies as well, e.g. [30,32]. This difference might be a result ofﬁcant Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit test indicated no good ﬁt.
convenience sampling, where larger farms are possibly more often
recalled by veterinarians than small farms or due to the fact that
bigger farms are more often categorized under dairy farms in
the Digital Phone Guide than smaller farms. As a consequence,
the representativeness of this study for all farms in the north-
ern part of the Netherlands is reduced and the results are more
strongly related to farmers operating larger and more specialized
farms.
Exact logistic regression was applied to analyse parameters and
incentives important for case and control farmers to participate (or
not) in a JD programme now (and in the future). No ﬁnal model
parameters were obtained for the cluster ‘incentives’ because of
zero or low entry cells due to the low number of cases and controls.
Also, the variables were moderately correlated and as a result did
not ﬁt in the multivariable model. Therefore, univariable results
of the incentives to participate in a voluntary programme will be
discussed. The two statistically signiﬁcant incentives were aware-
ness of animal health and welfare and (potential) economic losses
due to JD. This is in agreement with the study of Valeeva et al.
[26] who found a relatively high importance attached to these fac-
tors, as well as with the study of Kovich et al. [24] who found
herd health as one of the major reasons to participate in a JD
programme. Both studies differed from ours in that they did not
compare the results with a control group. Comparable with the
study of Valeeva et al. [26], external factors, which are related to
the performance of the sector or the public health concern, were
valued as the least important motivating factors. On the other
hand, internal factors related to farm performance and individ-
ual farmers, provided more motivation to participate (Table 2).
These results suggest that factors implying awareness of the per-
formance of thewhole dairy sector,which are rather external to the
farmer, have little inﬂuence on the decision of the farmer to par-
ticipate in a JD programme. The fact that case farmers were more
experienced in farming, and that a greater proportion of them had
participated in study groups (Table 1), could explain the signiﬁ-
cantly higher ranking of awareness of animal health and welfare
and (potential) economic losses due to JD. Moreover, signiﬁcantly
more case farmers participate in the ‘Salmonella Unsuspected’
control programme, in which similar management practices are
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equired to reduce disease incidence. Although the management
ractices themselves did not differ signiﬁcantly between the case
nd control farmers, the importance of animal health and wel-
are awareness could increase participation in both the Salmonella
nd JD programme. The incentive of case farmers ‘(potential) eco-
omic losses due to JD’ (Table 2) and ‘the presence or absence of
D on the farm’ of both farmer groups is in line with the result
hat case farmers tended to have (had) more problems with JD
n the farm and with the belief of farmers of having (had) JD on
heir farm. Therefore, it can be concluded that ‘the presence of
D on the farm’ was an important criterion for the case farmers,
hereas ‘the absence of JD on the farm’ and consequently ‘hav-
ng no economic losses due to JD’ was important for the control
armers.
On top of that, the farming goal ‘obtain a high proﬁt’ (Table 4)
ndicates that case farmers were especially motivated by having an
fﬁcient (well-organized) farm and, to achieve that goal, (poten-
ial) economic losses due to JD were avoided as much as possible
risk averse). This is in line with Kahneman et al. [20] who stated
hat people are signiﬁcantly more averse to losses than they are
ttracted to same-sized gains. No statistically signiﬁcant univari-
ble association was found between public health concerns and
articipation. This is remarkable, since the study of Kovich et al.
24] showed a deﬁnite relation between consumer health and par-
icipation in a JD programme, although a control group was not
ncluded in their study.
Incentives for not participating in a JD programme mainly
ocused on the costs of testing and changing management, build-
ngs etc., and on the reliability of the tests (Table 2). Especially for
ontrol farmers who think they have no JD on their farm, test costs
ere the main reason for not participating (Table 2). This is in line
ith the results of Kovich et al. [24] who found free testing as one
f the major incentives to participate. Furthermore, the inﬂuence
f currently being a control farmer, comparedwith case farmers, on
oth ‘change in test costs’ and ‘change in regulatory requirements’
s incentives to participate in the future was statistically signif-
cant (Table 3). This is not surprising, since it is likely that dairy
ompanies will oblige farmers to participate and, in addition, free
esting is currently used to persuade farmers to participate for at
east one year. Although the farmers were asked to answer ques-
ions with regard to the situation before free testing, it is likely that
armers took the new situation into account as well. Apparently
he other two main incentives for case farmers – i.e., the reliabil-
ty of the tests and the costs for changing management, buildings
tc. – are less important when offering the possibility for free
esting.
Although the capability to manage JD problems and the level
f knowledge regarding JD were estimated higher by case farm-
rs, control farmers tended to show a better insight into the annual
osts of participating in a JD programme for both average contami-
ated and average not contaminated Dutch dairy farms. This might
ndicate that case farmers overestimated their knowledge or, more
lausible, that they were less interested in test costs. The latter is
n line with the incentives mentioned in Table 2.
Furthermore, it can be concluded that the case farmers were
ore willing to take notice of the advice of the veterinarian and of
he Animal Health Service, whereas the control farmers were more
nﬂuenced by critics in the professional literature (Table 4). The
mpact of the advice of veterinarians on farmers was also found in
tudies of Zwald et al. [32] and Shaw et al. [33]. During the tele-
hone conversations with veterinarians working in the region of
rigin of the study farms to select farmers for this study, most of
hem agreed on this. Especially participation in the intensive pro-
ramme was stimulated by them. Since it was beyond the scope of
his study it was not investigated whether there were differences
etween farmers participating in the simpliﬁed or the intensiveal of Life Sciences 58 (2011) 57–64 63
programme. Furthermore,nocomparisonwasmadebetween farm-
ers who thought they had JD on their farm and farmers who
thought they had not. Very likely there were differences between
the groups. Further research on this is recommended.
Overall, it can be concluded that the farmers of this study were
more motivated by internal factors related to farm performance
and the individual farmer, rather than to external factors like con-
sumer health and awareness of the performance of the whole dairy
sector. The case farmers were less interested in test costs and, by
having a well-organized farm now and in the future, (potential)
economic losses due to JD were avoided as much as possible. This
indicates that on average the risk-averse case farmers were more
focused on future gains than on current costs, whereas the control
farmers were motivated merely by costs in their decisions to (not)
participate now and in the future.
As with any questionnaire, the farmers might have responded
to certain questions in a manner they believed would be
viewed favourably. Furthermore, in semi-qualitative research the
researcher can inﬂuence the process [34]. It is unlikely that this
type of information bias invalidated the results of this study, since
desirable answers and answers leading farmers into a certain direc-
tion were neutralized by asking open-ended questions ﬁrst instead
of similar closed ones. On the other hand, the length of the ques-
tionnaire may have contributed to giving desirable answers and
thus information bias. Another source of bias in this study was that
farmers were asked to remember incentives and other events that
occurred in somecases as far back as12years ago (start of the inten-
sive JD programme). This may have introduced recall bias into the
study.
The sample size was not comparable with the sample size of
other farm surveys, since most dairy farmer incentives have been
assessed through postal surveys [33,35,36]. In this respect the sam-
plewas small becausewe chose to interview farmers on site instead
of relying on reported incentives. Another limitation of our study
is that we selected one control farmer per case farmer instead of
two. This was done because of time and budget limitations.
The wide conﬁdence intervals of the ORs are a consequence
of both the small sample size and the variation in opinions of
farmers about the importance of incentives, which is consistent
with the expectation that motivation for (not) participating in a JD
programme differs among individuals. Also, the wide conﬁdence
intervals indicate that one should be careful when comparing the
OR of different parameters and incentives. The results of the study
identify the relative order of parameters and incentives important
for farmers, rather than the magnitude of the contribution of these
factors. Therefore, the magnitude should be interpreted with cau-
tion.
Finally, the incentives for (not) participating in a JD programme
are not important on their own. Given that the management prac-
tices did not differ signiﬁcantly between case and control farmers
and given that several practices can be improved, incentives to
improve the practices are important as are incentives to reach the
ultimategoal of theprogramme:eradicateMAPatherd level (inten-
sive programme) or reduce the number of MAP bacteria per litre of
bulk milk (simpliﬁed programme).
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